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Keep AWS Private CA for workloads. Add attested device identity with Smallstep.

AWS Private CA issues to callers IAM authorizes and enrolls managed devices through its SCEP and Active Directory connectors. Smallstep adds CA-verified hardware attestation on supported enrollment paths and manages certificate delivery and renewal across a mixed fleet.

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CA-verified hardware attestation, on supported paths
Issuance tied to an MDM-synced device inventory
Certificates delivered and renewed on the endpoint
Wi-Fi, VPN, and SSH set up to use the certificate
Device certificates for IAM Roles Anywhere
X.509 chains to your existing trust anchor

An IAM-authorized caller, or a device in a managed fleet?

AWS Private CA signs for whoever IAM allows to call it, under a certificate template, and its connectors extend that to Active Directory autoenrollment, SCEP, and Kubernetes. That suits workloads and AWS services. What AWS does not document is one workflow that combines MDM inventory, CA-verified hardware attestation, and certificate delivery across a mixed endpoint fleet. Smallstep provides that on supported paths.

  • AWS Private CA: IAM permission plus template; connectors: domain or SCEP challenge
  • Smallstep: attestation on supported paths plus an MDM-synced inventory
  • Workload PKI versus fleet certificate management

AWS with Intune SCEP, or attested Windows enrollment

AWS Connector for SCEP has an Intune type: Intune issues and validates a dynamic challenge per request and AWS Private CA signs, and Intune can require TPM key storage on Windows. TPM-backed is not CA-verified attestation. On Smallstep's attested Windows path, the agent proves the key was created in the TPM and the CA checks that against inventory before signing. For other MDMs, AWS's general-purpose connector uses a static challenge, which AWS warns can issue any certificate with any subject.

ACME Device Attestation

Who gets the certificate onto the endpoint?

With AWS Private CA, delivery belongs to something else: Intune deploys the SCEP certificate and Wi-Fi profile, Active Directory autoenrollment handles domain-joined Windows, ACM places certificates on AWS services, and your code handles the rest. Smallstep manages delivery and renewal itself for supported Wi-Fi, VPN, and SSH workflows. Some workflows use the attested device identity to obtain a separate application credential; key protection depends on the platform and application.

Let attested devices call AWS with IAM Roles Anywhere

IAM Roles Anywhere exchanges an X.509 certificate for temporary AWS credentials and accepts an external CA as its trust anchor. Register a Smallstep authority and a device certificate issued on an attested path can obtain short-lived credentials, with no long-term access keys on the laptop. Scope the trust anchor and role policies to device certificate attributes, and confirm the signing helper can use the device's key on each platform.

Neither replaces the other

Smallstep does not place certificates on load balancers, CloudFront, or API Gateway through ACM, does not offer an Active Directory autoenrollment connector, and does not issue ML-DSA certificates today, which AWS Private CA does. AWS does not document ACME device attestation, or a workflow combining an MDM-synced inventory, hardware attestation, and credential deployment for Wi-Fi, VPN, and apps across a mixed fleet. Keep your existing X.509 trust anchor and sign a Smallstep intermediate beneath it.

Bring your own root guide

When AWS Private CA is the right starting point

If the certificates are for AWS services, EKS and EC2 workloads, or domain-joined Windows through Active Directory autoenrollment, AWS Private CA is a sound choice. If AWS Private CA and Intune SCEP already meet your fleet's requirements, keep them. Add Smallstep when you need CA-verified hardware attestation or consistent certificate lifecycle management across a mixed fleet.

  • AWS services and workloads: begin with AWS Private CA
  • Fleet enrollment that Intune SCEP already covers: keep it
  • CA-verified attestation or one lifecycle across a mixed fleet: add Smallstep
  • Run both under one root when the estate needs both

What Smallstep adds to an AWS Private CA estate

Attestation checked against the fleet inventory

On supported paths, the TPM or Secure Enclave attestation is checked against inventory before issuance.

An inventory that gates issuance

Devices sync from your MDM or the API. Devices not in the inventory get no certificate.

Delivery to the endpoint

MDM profiles and the Smallstep agent install and renew the certificate.

Client profiles deployed too

Wi-Fi, VPN, and SSH are configured on the device to use the certificate.

Short lifetimes without per-certificate math

Device certificates renew often by design; Smallstep's cost model does not count certificates issued.

Keep your existing trust anchor

Your existing root, in AWS Private CA or elsewhere, signs the Smallstep intermediate.

Keep AWS Private CA for workloads. Add attested device identity with Smallstep.

Attested enrollment against your MDM-synced inventory on supported paths, credentials delivered and renewed on the endpoint for Wi-Fi, VPN, and SSH, and device certificates IAM Roles Anywhere can trust.

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FAQs Smallstep for AWS Private CA environments

Not for AWS services and workloads. AWS Private CA issues private certificates to callers IAM authorizes, integrates with ACM for load balancers, CloudFront, and API Gateway, and offers connectors for Active Directory, SCEP, and Kubernetes. Smallstep is a certificate platform built around device identity: it decides from attestation on supported paths and an MDM-synced inventory whether a device should get a certificate, puts it there, and keeps it renewed. A common split is AWS Private CA for workloads and AWS services, and Smallstep for laptops, phones, and SSH access.

IAM permission and the template. A caller with permission to call IssueCertificate submits a CSR, and the certificate template and CA configuration constrain the result. The connectors add their own authorization: Active Directory autoenrollment relies on domain membership and template permissions, and Connector for SCEP relies on a challenge, dynamic and validated by Intune for the Intune connector type, static for the general-purpose type. See the Connector for SCEP considerations. AWS does not document a step that verifies where the private key was generated against an approved device inventory.

AWS does not document ACME device attestation for AWS Private CA or its connectors. Smallstep co-developed the device-attest-01 challenge at the IETF and supports it on macOS, iOS, and iPadOS through an MDM, and on Windows and Linux through the Smallstep agent using TPM 2.0. If AWS adds it, compare what each verifies and how the device record is authorized.

It is device enrollment, and with the Intune connector type it is a sound one: Intune manages dynamic challenges, validates the request, and deploys the certificate and Wi-Fi profile, and on Windows Intune can require TPM key storage and fail enrollment without it. The distinction is that TPM-backed storage is not CA-verified attestation, so AWS Private CA signs without evidence of where the key was created. The general-purpose connector used with other MDMs supports only static challenges, and AWS warns that a single challenge password can issue any certificate with any subject and SANs; Smallstep's Dynamic SCEP issues a one-time challenge per device. Connector for SCEP also requires a CA in general-purpose mode and issues one-year certificates by default unless the CSR requests otherwise.

It lets domain-joined Windows computers and users autoenroll from AWS Private CA through Group Policy, much as they would from AD CS. It covers Windows in a domain; it does not reach Macs, Linux, phones, or Entra-joined devices outside the domain. AWS does not document TPM key attestation for its templates, so confirm the key storage behavior for your template before relying on it. Smallstep covers the mixed fleet from one inventory and verifies attestation on supported paths.

Yes. Keep your existing X.509 trust anchor. With bring your own root, you upload the root certificate, never the key; Smallstep generates the intermediate key and returns a CSR, which you sign in AWS Private CA as a subordinate CA certificate and upload. X.509 certificates issued by that Smallstep authority then chain to the root your clients already trust; SSH certificates use their own CA trust. Bring your own root requires an Advanced Authority and may need to be enabled for your account. See the bring your own root guide.

Yes, as a design to validate. IAM Roles Anywhere accepts an external CA bundle as a trust anchor, so a Smallstep authority can be registered and device certificates from it exchanged for temporary AWS credentials through the AWS signing helper. Scope the profile and role trust policy to certificate attributes, such as the device identifier, and confirm on each platform that the signing helper can use the device's key, since key protection varies by OS and application.

AWS publishes a monthly charge per CA that depends on the CA's mode, a charge per certificate issued, and an OCSP charge per certificate per month plus per query; see AWS Private CA pricing. Short-lived mode costs less per CA and per certificate but limits validity to seven days, and Connector for SCEP needs a general-purpose CA. That structure means more CAs, more renewals, and OCSP all add cost. Smallstep does not charge per certificate issued, so short lifetimes and frequent renewal do not change the bill; ask us for a quote for your fleet.

Not necessarily. Workloads that already authenticate to Vault are the case its PKI engine was built for, and that setup can stay. Smallstep also issues workload certificates, through ACME, a cert-manager issuer, and cloud instance identity, and some teams consolidate to reduce the number of CAs they operate. The stronger reason to add Smallstep is the device fleet: CA-verified hardware attestation and managed certificate delivery, which Vault does not combine in one documented workflow.

AWS Private CA publishes CRLs to an S3 bucket and offers OCSP as a separately charged option. Smallstep offers CRL and OCSP on Advanced Authorities. Offboarding a device is a sequence: removing it from inventory blocks new issuance and renewal but does not invalidate a certificate already issued; revoking the certificate changes access only where the relying service checks revocation; and ending an active session is a separate control at that service.

Not necessarily. AWS Private CA with ACM, the cert-manager issuer, and IAM is built for that case, and it can stay. Smallstep also issues workload certificates, through ACME, a cert-manager issuer, and AWS instance identity, and some teams consolidate to reduce the number of CAs they pay for and operate. The stronger reason to add Smallstep is the device side.

AWS Private CA supports ML-DSA-44, -65, and -87 CA keys and certificates today. Smallstep has shipped hybrid ML-KEM key exchange and has not shipped ML-DSA certificates. If a dated post-quantum signature requirement is the deciding factor, AWS Private CA is further along; the device side of that migration also depends on TPMs and relying parties that can use ML-DSA. See the post-quantum readiness page.

The Smallstep agent is documented for Windows, macOS, and Linux, each requiring a TPM 2.0 or Secure Enclave for attested enrollment. ChromeOS enrolls through Google Verified Access. iOS and iPadOS use ACME device attestation through a supporting MDM, and Android uses Dynamic SCEP without attestation. Key protection varies by platform and application and is published in the documentation rather than averaged into one claim.

No. AWS Connector for SCEP relies on the MDM to deliver the profile and the challenge. Smallstep uses the MDM as an inventory source and a delivery channel for the agent and certificates, and works with Jamf, Intune, Workspace ONE, Mosyle, Iru, Fleet, and Google Workspace.