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Give every workload a short-lived identity

Smallstep issues and renews short-lived X.509 certificates for workloads across Kubernetes, cloud, and on-prem environments. Requests are authorized through Kubernetes service accounts, cloud instance identity, policy-based enrollment, or hardware-backed device attestation, helping teams replace the long-lived credentials behind mTLS.

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Cross-platform coverageCross-platform coverage
Seamless integration
Certificate iconReduce credential theft & replay risk
Searchable issuance records
IDP integration
Static keys iconReplace static keys with certificates

From device identity to workload identity

Device identity is the first layer: Smallstep co-created the IETF standard for device attestation with Google, now adopted by Apple and other major platforms, giving the devices and hosts in your infrastructure cryptographic identities of their own. Workload identity is the layer above it. The services running on those hosts earn their own short-lived certificates, authorized by their own evidence, such as Kubernetes service-account identity, cloud instance identity, and policy-controlled enrollment.

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The last rotation runbook you'll delete

If you already run step-ca for service certificates, Step CA Pro slots in where it sits, no rebuild and no new root. You keep the CA and root signing keys under your control and gain what open source leaves out: active revocation over CRL and OCSP, a searchable issuance history for audit, per-provisioner issuance policy, and HSM-backed signing.

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Policy decides who gets a certificate

Before issuing a certificate, Smallstep validates evidence such as Kubernetes service-account identity, cloud instance identity, or hardware-backed device attestation. Issuance policies determine which requests and identity attributes are accepted, and every issuance is recorded, so you can answer who got a credential, under which policy, and when.

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Short-lived certificates for Kubernetes

Each enrolled pod can receive and automatically renew a short-lived X.509 identity for mTLS, issued through autocert, cert-manager, or ACME. Certificates rotate on their own schedule, so service-to-service encryption inside the cluster stops depending on secrets someone has to distribute and remember to rotate.

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Standards-based, not vendor-locked

Smallstep helped write the IETF standard for high-assurance device identity, and we're bringing the same posture to workloads: identifiers can follow SPIFFE conventions, and the emerging IETF WIMSE drafts on workload credentials and proof of possession are shaping where this product goes. Cloud providers already accept federated workload identities in place of stored access keys, mapping them to short-lived cloud credentials through their native flows. Standards keep the exit door open.

From step-ca to Step CA Pro, no rebuild

If you already run step-ca for service certificates, Step CA Pro slots in where it sits. You keep the CA and the root signing keys under your control and gain attestation verification, issuance policy, a management interface, and the compliance options the open source server doesn't ship.

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Step CA Pro + Smallstep

Get the Data Sheet

Smallstep Workload Security issues and automatically renews short-lived X.509 certificates for workloads, with issuance controlled by policy and authorized using platform evidence. Searchable issuance records show each certificate's identity, issuer, provisioner, and validity period, so audits and incident reviews start from data instead of guesswork.

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The CA is the easy part

Signing certificates is a solved problem. What turns a certificate into workload identity is everything around it: validating enrollment evidence, enforcing issuance policy, automating renewal and revocation, and keeping searchable records of what was issued to whom. That surrounding machinery is what teams underestimate when they build in-house, and it's what the platform provides.

Zero Trust doesn't stop at the laptop

Extend the same identity guarantees you enforce for devices to every service that runs your business.

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FAQs Smallstep for DevOps teams

A verifiable, short-lived credential identifying a running piece of software: a pod, a VM, a CI job. The workload presents evidence of where it is running, such as a service-account identity or an instance identity document, and receives a credential authorized by that evidence. It expires quickly and renews automatically, so long-lived shared secrets drop out of the picture.

An active IETF working group, chartered in 2024, standardizing workload-to-workload authentication across clouds and on-prem environments. Its drafts define a URI-based Workload Identifier scoped to a trust domain, workload credentials in X.509 and JWT form, and a proof-of-possession token that binds a request to the workload's private key. Smallstep tracks these drafts so the credentials you deploy line up with where the standard is heading.

SPIFFE is a widely adopted open source pattern for workload identity; WIMSE is the IETF effort formalizing the same problem at the protocol level, and they are complementary. Smallstep can issue certificates carrying SPIFFE-style URI identifiers; if you run or plan to run SPIFFE/SPIRE, talk to us about how the pieces fit together.

Federation lets an external system accept your workload's credential instead of holding a secret for it. The workload presents its token to the cloud provider's security token service and receives temporary cloud credentials in return. AWS, GCP, and Azure all support it, which means no cloud access keys in your secrets manager and no service-account key files in your deployments.

An OAuth 2.0 mechanism (RFC 8693) for trading one token for another with a different audience or scope. At each trust boundary, the calling service exchanges its credential for one minted for the next hop, optionally recording who is acting on whose behalf. A token stolen from one service cannot be replayed against another, and the audit trail shows the full chain.

For genuine secrets like third-party API keys, yes. But most of what fills a vault is internal credentials that exist only because services had no identity of their own. Those go away, the vault shrinks, and what remains is what you actually cannot eliminate.

Typically hours, with automatic background renewal. Revocation stops being an emergency: remove the workload or change policy and no new credential is issued, while the existing one ages out on its own.

Usually not much. Workloads pick up certificates through standard interfaces: files delivered by the Smallstep agent or your orchestrator, cert-manager secrets in Kubernetes, or ACME. Anything that already speaks mTLS consumes them as-is, so the change concentrates in platform configuration rather than application code.