Register for part 2 of our Device Identity Webinar Series!

Keep Duo for MFA. Add device certificates for Wi-Fi, VPN, and SSH.

Duo verifies users and can enforce device trust and health policies in supported sign-in flows. Smallstep verifies hardware attestation against your approved inventory on supported enrollment paths, then issues certificates that your network and infrastructure verify directly: the RADIUS server checks the certificate before the device joins Wi-Fi.

Get a demo
background gradientbackground texture

Trusted by

RADIUS checks the certificate before the device joins Wi-Fi
Attestation against an approved inventory, on supported paths
Hardware-bound keys on supported credential paths
Credentials VPN, SSH hosts, and services verify directly
Host-verified SSH certificates, no push per connection
Keeps Duo for MFA, device trust, and health at the prompt

Device trust at the prompt, or a certificate the network checks?

Duo authenticates the user, and in supported browser-based flows its Trusted Endpoints and Device Health policies decide whether the device is managed, registered, and healthy; registration can be TPM or Secure Enclave signed. Smallstep asks a different question at a different time: on supported enrollment paths it checks attestation against approved inventory before issuing a certificate. At Wi-Fi, RADIUS checks that the certificate is valid and the device holds the matching key.

  • "Is this registered device managed and healthy?" is answered at the Duo prompt
  • "Is this certificate valid, and does the device hold its key?" is answered by the RADIUS server
  • Different question, different time, different verifier

Registration and management records versus proof of provenance

Duo establishes device trust several ways and recommends combining them: management integrations matching Duo Desktop identifiers to MDM data (a nightly sync for Jamf Pro), desktop registration signed by the TPM or Secure Enclave after an unsigned first payload, manual enrollment, and an API-fed device cache. Duo can verify that the device signing in is the one that registered. On supported high-assurance paths, Smallstep verifies that an attested hardware identity matches an approved device record before issuing the attested credential; that identity is retained while the record and enrollment policy are preserved.

One prompt in front, or a credential each service verifies

Duo provides MFA across SSO, VPN, RDP, and Duo Unix for SSH, and applies Trusted Endpoints and Device Health in the browser-based flows that support them; coverage differs by flow. Smallstep verifies attestation at enrollment, then issues credentials that the RADIUS server checks before Wi-Fi admission, VPN and ZTNA gateways check at connection, and SSH hosts check through certificates, without a Duo push at each connection; key protection varies by OS, client, and use.

Neither layer replaces the other

Smallstep does not replace Duo for user MFA and does not replace Duo Desktop's built-in endpoint health checks; Smallstep RADIUS can apply external posture results through a webhook, but does not run them. Duo Trusted Endpoints is not a general-purpose device certificate issuer and does not verify device provenance against an approved inventory. On a fleet that runs both, each protects its own access paths: Duo at the flows behind its prompt, certificate-based access for Wi-Fi, VPN, SSH, and services. There is no shipped integration between the two.

When Duo is the right starting point

If the requirement is user MFA across applications, VPN, and remote access with one prompt and one admin panel, with device trust and health policy in the flows that support them, Duo is built for it. If the requirement is certificate Wi-Fi, VPN, SSH, mTLS, or an identity provider that must know which attested hardware is connecting, start with device identity. Okta Device Trust vs device identity

User MFA and health policy at one prompt: begin with Duo Hardware-bound credentials for network, infrastructure, and SSO: begin with device identity Run both when the fleet needs both

What Smallstep adds to a Duo fleet

The network checks the certificate first

Smallstep checks attestation against approved inventory before issuing, on supported paths. At Wi-Fi, RADIUS checks that the certificate is valid and the device holds its key before admission; VPN gateways and SSH hosts do the same on theirs.

An approved record, not a registration

Duo verifies that the device signing in is the one that registered. On supported enrollment paths, Smallstep verifies that an attested hardware identity matches an approved device record before the credential is issued.

Hardware-bound keys on supported credential paths

The enrollment key lives in the secure element; the credential each application uses may differ in protection, and the platform matrix says which.

Host-verified SSH certificates

Short-lived SSH certificates issued to attested devices and checked by the host, with no Duo push at each connection.

Identity tied to the hardware record

Issuance authorized against a trusted device record from your MDM or API; the attested identity is retained while that record and enrollment policy are preserved.

Runs alongside Duo

Smallstep adds attested enrollment and certificates for the network and infrastructure; Duo keeps MFA, device trust, and health at its prompt. Different access paths, one fleet.

Keep Duo for MFA. Add certificates your network and infrastructure verify directly.

Hardware-attested enrollment against your inventory, non-exportable keys where the platform supports them, and one device identity behind the Wi-Fi, VPN, SSH, service, and SSO credentials each resource verifies on its own.

Book a demo

FAQs Smallstep for Cisco Duo environments

No. Duo authenticates the person with push, passkeys, or tokens and applies device trust and health policy in supported sign-in flows; Smallstep does not replace it for user MFA. The difference is what each makes the device prove, when, and who uses the result: Duo decides at its prompt whether a registered or managed device may proceed; Smallstep decides at enrollment, from attestation against an approved inventory, whether to issue a certificate that RADIUS, VPN, and SSH hosts verify independently.

Through Trusted Endpoints, with several methods Duo recommends combining. Management integrations match identifiers reported by Duo Desktop (Windows, macOS, Linux) or Duo Mobile (iOS, Android) against data from your MDM; for Jamf Pro that is a nightly read-only sync keyed on UDID. Desktop registration binds a device to its users during a browser-based authentication: the first payload is unsigned, later payloads are signed by the TPM 2.0 or Secure Enclave, and a policy can block devices whose signature does not match. Manual enrollment and an API-fed device cache cover the rest. Legacy certificate-based verification reached end of life on October 7, 2024.

A match to an approved record, on supported high-assurance enrollment paths. Duo's hardware-signed registration, completed during an active Duo MFA authentication, verifies that the device signing in is the one that registered. Smallstep verifies that an attested hardware identity, through the TPM endorsement key or Apple attestation, matches a device record your organization approved before the attested device credential is issued; a provisional SCEP certificate or bootstrap token may precede that step. Neither proves who bought or owns the device. Key protection for downstream application credentials varies by OS, client, and use case and is documented per platform.

Not with its own checks. Smallstep does not replace Duo Desktop's endpoint health checks for OS version, firewall, disk encryption, or password, and has no self-remediation flow; Duo Advantage and Premier include that policy, Duo Essentials does not. Smallstep Managed RADIUS can call a webhook on each authentication to apply an external posture result. There is no shipped integration with Duo for that; ask before designing around it.

Duo Unix adds a Duo prompt to SSH logins on each protected host; Duo Network Gateway can instead cover several SSH hosts after one authentication for a configurable session. Smallstep issues short-lived SSH certificates to attested devices, so each host verifies the certificate itself and the session proceeds without a Duo push at that connection; the user factor is whatever your SSH certificate policy or identity provider requires at issuance.

Duo MFA: SSO through Duo SSO or an identity provider integration, VPN through RADIUS, Windows logon and RDP, and SSH through Duo Unix. Duo Trusted Endpoints and Device Health: the browser-based authentication flows Duo documents for them; Duo Unix, native Windows logon, and RADIUS VPN have their own flows, so do not assume device trust applies wherever MFA does. Smallstep: Wi-Fi over EAP-TLS verified by the RADIUS server, VPN and ZTNA over certificates, SSH through certificates, mutual TLS to internal services, and a device factor at Okta or certificate-based authentication at Entra ID. Smallstep verifies attestation at enrollment; what each service verifies at access is its own check of the credential.

Differently. Duo can be an authenticator in Okta's sign-in policy: Okta's built-in Duo Security authenticator uses the Duo Traditional Prompt, and configuring Duo as a custom identity provider authenticator in Okta is the path to the Duo Universal Prompt. Duo can evaluate Trusted Endpoints in supported flows when the policy is enabled. Smallstep integrates as an external identity provider factor: the device presents a certificate, loaded into the browser by the agent and bound to the TPM or Secure Enclave where supported, and Smallstep verifies it over mutual TLS against the inventory before answering Okta. The two can coexist on the same fleet; requiring both in one sign-in policy has not been validated.

Different mechanisms, not equivalent device factors. Duo integrates with Entra ID as an external authentication method, with Trusted Endpoints evaluated at the Duo prompt. Smallstep's Entra path is certificate-based authentication of a user certificate with issuance-time device assurance on top of Entra's controls, not a separate device factor or a live inventory check at sign-in.

Yes. Duo Desktop runs on Windows, macOS, and Linux (Debian, Ubuntu, RHEL, CentOS Stream on x86), and device registration on Linux uses TPM 2.0. Smallstep supports Linux through the agent with TPM attestation, and iOS and iPadOS through ACME device attestation with your MDM; Android enrolls through Dynamic SCEP without attestation. Compare supported distributions and checks directly if Linux breadth is the deciding factor.

Not where the device check is required and enrollment and recovery are separately protected. With Duo, the user must also approve the push or present a passkey, and with Trusted Endpoints enforced the device must be managed or registered. With Smallstep, the device must present a valid certificate and prove it holds the key; on supported enrollment paths that certificate was issued only after attestation matched an approved inventory record, and on other paths key protection varies. The difference is in what the device check rests on: a registration or management record evaluated at the prompt, versus a credential issued after attestation and verified by the service. Neither protects resources outside its enforcement, and neither sign-in check, by itself, binds the resulting application session to the device.

In Duo desktop registration, removing a device lets it register again, while blocking it prevents future registration, so block a stolen device; a device that leaves the MDM also stops matching its management integration. In Smallstep, removing the device from inventory stops issuance and renewal, revoking its certificate blocks the next authentication where the verifier checks revocation, and ending an active session is the relying party's job; Smallstep RADIUS checks revocation on each authentication but has no Change of Authorization.

No. Duo's management integrations use the MDM for the managed-device data they match against, and Duo Desktop runs alongside it. Smallstep uses the MDM as an inventory source and a delivery channel for the agent and certificates, and works with Jamf, Intune, Workspace ONE, Mosyle, Iru, Fleet, and Google Workspace.

The Smallstep agent is documented for Windows, macOS, and Linux, each requiring a TPM 2.0 or Secure Enclave for attested enrollment. ChromeOS enrolls through the Smallstep extension using Google Verified Access. iOS and iPadOS use ACME device attestation through a supporting MDM, and Android uses Dynamic SCEP. Key protection varies by platform and application and is published in the documentation rather than averaged into one claim.

Device inventory and certificate lifecycle records: which device, how it enrolled, whether it attested, which certificates it holds and their lifetimes, and the authority policies that set the key types. Confirm with Smallstep the exact fields and export formats available in your deployment before promising them to an auditor. Those records support the cryptographic inventory and migration plan IR 8547 asks for; they do not demonstrate post-quantum authentication, which depends on the relying parties.