Keep Duo for MFA. Add device certificates for Wi-Fi, VPN, and SSH.
Duo verifies users and can enforce device trust and health policies in supported sign-in flows. Smallstep verifies hardware attestation against your approved inventory on supported enrollment paths, then issues certificates that your network and infrastructure verify directly: the RADIUS server checks the certificate before the device joins Wi-Fi.
Trusted by

Device trust at the prompt, or a certificate the network checks?
Duo authenticates the user, and in supported browser-based flows its Trusted Endpoints and Device Health policies decide whether the device is managed, registered, and healthy; registration can be TPM or Secure Enclave signed. Smallstep asks a different question at a different time: on supported enrollment paths it checks attestation against approved inventory before issuing a certificate. At Wi-Fi, RADIUS checks that the certificate is valid and the device holds the matching key.
- "Is this registered device managed and healthy?" is answered at the Duo prompt
- "Is this certificate valid, and does the device hold its key?" is answered by the RADIUS server
- Different question, different time, different verifier

Registration and management records versus proof of provenance
Duo establishes device trust several ways and recommends combining them: management integrations matching Duo Desktop identifiers to MDM data (a nightly sync for Jamf Pro), desktop registration signed by the TPM or Secure Enclave after an unsigned first payload, manual enrollment, and an API-fed device cache. Duo can verify that the device signing in is the one that registered. On supported high-assurance paths, Smallstep verifies that an attested hardware identity matches an approved device record before issuing the attested credential; that identity is retained while the record and enrollment policy are preserved.

One prompt in front, or a credential each service verifies
Duo provides MFA across SSO, VPN, RDP, and Duo Unix for SSH, and applies Trusted Endpoints and Device Health in the browser-based flows that support them; coverage differs by flow. Smallstep verifies attestation at enrollment, then issues credentials that the RADIUS server checks before Wi-Fi admission, VPN and ZTNA gateways check at connection, and SSH hosts check through certificates, without a Duo push at each connection; key protection varies by OS, client, and use.

Neither layer replaces the other
Smallstep does not replace Duo for user MFA and does not replace Duo Desktop's built-in endpoint health checks; Smallstep RADIUS can apply external posture results through a webhook, but does not run them. Duo Trusted Endpoints is not a general-purpose device certificate issuer and does not verify device provenance against an approved inventory. On a fleet that runs both, each protects its own access paths: Duo at the flows behind its prompt, certificate-based access for Wi-Fi, VPN, SSH, and services. There is no shipped integration between the two.

When Duo is the right starting point
If the requirement is user MFA across applications, VPN, and remote access with one prompt and one admin panel, with device trust and health policy in the flows that support them, Duo is built for it. If the requirement is certificate Wi-Fi, VPN, SSH, mTLS, or an identity provider that must know which attested hardware is connecting, start with device identity. Okta Device Trust vs device identity
User MFA and health policy at one prompt: begin with Duo Hardware-bound credentials for network, infrastructure, and SSO: begin with device identity Run both when the fleet needs both
What Smallstep adds to a Duo fleet
The network checks the certificate first
Smallstep checks attestation against approved inventory before issuing, on supported paths. At Wi-Fi, RADIUS checks that the certificate is valid and the device holds its key before admission; VPN gateways and SSH hosts do the same on theirs.
An approved record, not a registration
Duo verifies that the device signing in is the one that registered. On supported enrollment paths, Smallstep verifies that an attested hardware identity matches an approved device record before the credential is issued.
Hardware-bound keys on supported credential paths
The enrollment key lives in the secure element; the credential each application uses may differ in protection, and the platform matrix says which.
Host-verified SSH certificates
Short-lived SSH certificates issued to attested devices and checked by the host, with no Duo push at each connection.
Identity tied to the hardware record
Issuance authorized against a trusted device record from your MDM or API; the attested identity is retained while that record and enrollment policy are preserved.
Runs alongside Duo
Smallstep adds attested enrollment and certificates for the network and infrastructure; Duo keeps MFA, device trust, and health at its prompt. Different access paths, one fleet.
Keep Duo for MFA. Add certificates your network and infrastructure verify directly.
Hardware-attested enrollment against your inventory, non-exportable keys where the platform supports them, and one device identity behind the Wi-Fi, VPN, SSH, service, and SSO credentials each resource verifies on its own.