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Keep Vault for secrets and workload PKI. Add attested device identity with Smallstep.

Vault and Intune already support SCEP enrollment for managed devices. Smallstep adds CA-verified hardware attestation on supported enrollment paths and manages certificate delivery and renewal for supported Wi-Fi, VPN, and SSH workflows.

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CA-verified hardware attestation, on supported paths
Issuance tied to an approved device inventory
Certificates delivered and renewed on the endpoint
Wi-Fi, VPN, and SSH set up to use the certificate
Hosted authorities, no cluster to run
X.509 chains to your existing trust anchor

A caller under a role, or a device in a managed fleet?

Vault's PKI roles sign for an authenticated caller: an AppRole, a Kubernetes service account, a cloud identity. For Linux workloads, Vault Enterprise's TPM auth method verifies a key was created in an enrolled TPM. Vault Agent automates obtaining and renewing the login certificate. Vault's TPM auth CA signs it. Vault Enterprise can also enroll Intune-managed devices over SCEP. What Vault does not document is one workflow that combines MDM inventory, CA-verified hardware attestation, and certificate delivery across a mixed endpoint fleet. Smallstep provides that on supported paths.

  • Vault PKI roles: caller plus role; Vault ACME: control of a name
  • Smallstep: attestation on supported paths plus an MDM-synced inventory
  • Workload PKI versus fleet certificate management

Vault with Intune SCEP, or attested Windows enrollment

Vault Enterprise with Intune SCEP works: Vault sends the challenge and CSR to Intune for validation, then signs if validation succeeds, and Intune can require TPM key storage on Windows. TPM-backed is not the same as CA-verified attestation. On Smallstep's attested Windows path, the agent proves the device key was created in the TPM and the CA verifies that against inventory before signing. Intune or the Smallstep agent can then manage the Windows Wi-Fi profile. Removing a device from inventory blocks issuance and renewal; a certificate already issued can still be accepted until it expires unless it is revoked and the relying service checks revocation.

ACME Device Attestation

Who gets the certificate onto the endpoint?

With Vault, delivery belongs to something else: Intune deploys the SCEP certificate and Wi-Fi profile, and Vault Agent writes certificates on servers. Smallstep manages delivery and renewal itself for supported Wi-Fi, VPN, and SSH workflows. Some workflows use the attested device identity to obtain a separate application credential. Key protection depends on the platform and application; the service enforcing access is configured on its side.

SSH: a signing service, or managed access

Vault's SSH engine signs user and host certificates, and its roles can restrict principals. Deploying the certificates, configuring host trust in sshd, and creating and retiring the accounts stay with your configuration management. Smallstep SSH issues short-lived certificates after single sign-on, can require an attested device, and enrolls hosts with their own certificates and synced users and groups.

Neither replaces the other

Smallstep does not store secrets, broker database credentials, or offer encryption as a service, and it does not offer EST or CMPv2 today, which Vault Enterprise does. Vault PKI does not document ACME device attestation, and Vault has no documented workflow that combines an MDM-synced inventory, hardware attestation, and credential deployment for Wi-Fi, VPN, and apps across a mixed endpoint fleet; its TPM auth serves Linux workloads logging in to Vault. Keep your existing X.509 trust anchor and sign a Smallstep intermediate beneath it.

Bring your own root guide

When Vault PKI is the right starting point

If the certificates are for services that already authenticate to Vault, or for network gear that needs EST or CMPv2, and your team already runs the cluster, Vault PKI is a sound choice. If Vault and Intune SCEP already meet your fleet's requirements, keep them. Add Smallstep when you need CA-verified hardware attestation or consistent certificate lifecycle management across a mixed fleet.

  • Service and pipeline certificates behind Vault auth: begin with Vault
  • Fleet enrollment that Vault and Intune SCEP already cover: keep it
  • CA-verified attestation or one lifecycle across a mixed fleet: add Smallstep
  • Run both under one root when the estate needs both

What Smallstep adds to a Vault estate

Attestation checked against the fleet inventory

On supported paths, the TPM or Secure Enclave attestation is checked against inventory before issuance.

An inventory that gates issuance

Devices sync from your MDM. Devices not in the inventory get no certificate.

Delivery to the endpoint

MDM profiles and the Smallstep agent install and renew the certificate.

Client profiles deployed too

Wi-Fi, VPN, and SSH are configured on the device to use the certificate.

Hosted authorities

Authorities run in Smallstep's cloud. No cluster to unseal or upgrade.

Keep your existing trust anchor

Your existing root signs the Smallstep intermediate. Clients keep trusting the same anchor.

Keep Vault for secrets and workload PKI. Add attested device identity with Smallstep.

Attested enrollment against your MDM-synced inventory on supported paths, credentials delivered and renewed on the endpoint for Wi-Fi, VPN, and SSH, and device verification at sign-in.

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FAQs Smallstep for HashiCorp Vault environments

Not for secrets management. Vault stores and brokers secrets, generates dynamic database and cloud credentials, and offers encryption as a service; Smallstep does none of that. The overlap is certificates. Vault's PKI and SSH secrets engines sign certificates for callers that authenticate to Vault, and Vault Enterprise can enroll MDM-managed devices over SCEP. Smallstep is a certificate platform built around device identity: it decides from attestation on supported paths and an MDM-synced inventory whether a device should get a certificate, puts it there, and keeps it renewed. A common split is Vault for secrets and workload certificates, and Smallstep for laptops, phones, and SSH access.

The caller and the role. A client authenticates to Vault through an auth method such as AppRole, Kubernetes, a cloud identity, OIDC, or a TLS client certificate, and receives a token. Vault policy decides which PKI role that token can use, and the role constrains the certificate: allowed names, key types, and lifetime. Vault Enterprise can also delegate the decision to an external policy service. See the Vault PKI secrets engine documentation. None of these steps examines where the private key was generated or whether the requester is a device in your fleet inventory. Vault Enterprise's TPM auth method is the exception for Linux workloads: it verifies through credential activation and attestation that a key was created in an enrolled TPM, from TPM records and groups an operator provisions, and issues a certificate for logging in to Vault from the auth method's own CA, not the PKI engine; from Vault Enterprise 2.2, Vault Agent automates obtaining and renewing the login certificate, and Vault's TPM auth CA signs it. It does not check the endorsement key against a manufacturer chain, so hardware genuineness is confirmed out of band.

Vault's documentation lists three ACME challenge types: http-01, dns-01, and tls-alpn-01, which prove control of a name, and describes ACME as a way to issue and renew server certificates; the ACME flow does not require a Vault token from the client by default. The device-attest-01 challenge is not listed. Smallstep co-developed ACME device attestation at the IETF and supports it natively on macOS, iOS, and iPadOS through an MDM, and on Windows and Linux through the Smallstep agent using TPM 2.0. If Vault adds the challenge, compare what each verifies and how the device record is authorized.

It is device enrollment, and with Intune it is a sound one. Vault Enterprise 1.20 and later can act as a SCEP server: Vault sends the challenge and CSR to Intune for validation, then signs if validation succeeds, and on Windows Intune can require TPM key storage and fail enrollment without it. Intune deploys the certificate and the Wi-Fi profile, and Vault documents optional certificate-based renewal without the original challenge. Only RSA issuers are compatible. The distinction is narrower than "Vault cannot do devices": TPM-backed storage is not CA-verified attestation, so Vault signs without evidence of where the key was created, and Vault does not document one workflow that combines MDM inventory, CA-verified hardware attestation, and certificate delivery across a mixed endpoint fleet. Jamf Pro uses Vault's static challenge type, a shared secret, where Smallstep's Dynamic SCEP issues a one-time challenge per device. On supported platforms Smallstep adds ACME device attestation so the hardware evidence is checked before issuance.

Vault: its own API on every edition, ACME for server certificates, and EST, CMPv2, and SCEP in Vault Enterprise. Vault's EST implementation covers enrollment and re-enrollment and does not include server-side key generation or CSR attributes. Smallstep: ACME including device attestation, SCEP and Dynamic SCEP, single sign-on through OIDC, JSON Web Key and X.509 chained authentication for automation, and cloud instance identity on AWS, Google Cloud, and Azure. Smallstep does not offer EST or CMPv2 today. If network equipment or cameras in your environment can only enroll over EST, Vault Enterprise covers that and Smallstep does not; ask us about timing before planning around it.

Yes. Keep your existing X.509 trust anchor. HashiCorp recommends keeping the root outside Vault and giving Vault a signed intermediate, so the root is often not in Vault at all. With bring your own root, you upload the root certificate, never the key. Smallstep generates the intermediate key in its managed cloud key store and returns a CSR. If Vault holds the root signing key, sign the CSR with the PKI engine's sign-intermediate endpoint. If Vault holds only an intermediate, sign a separate Smallstep intermediate with the existing root, wherever it is kept. X.509 certificates issued by that Smallstep authority then chain to the root your clients already trust; SSH certificates are a separate CA trust. Bring your own root requires an Advanced Authority and may need to be enabled for your account; confirm the key protection for your offering. The bring your own root guide covers the steps.

The open source step-ca server documents a registration authority mode that uses Vault's PKI engine as the upstream CA, authenticating to Vault with AppRole, Kubernetes, or AWS. In that arrangement step-ca handles enrollment and Vault signs. Whether that mode fits a hosted device identity deployment depends on the workflows you need, so confirm it with us before designing around it.

Vault's SSH secrets engine is a signing service for user and host certificates. A user authenticates to Vault and submits a public key; Vault returns a certificate under a role that can restrict principals; hosts accept it once the CA public key is added to sshd as a trusted user CA, and host certificates can be signed the same way. Deploying those certificates, configuring host trust, and creating and retiring accounts are tasks for your configuration management. Smallstep SSH is an access product on top of an SSH CA: users sign in through your identity provider, certificates are short-lived, an attested device can be required, with SSH key protection depending on the platform, hosts are enrolled with their own certificates, and users and groups sync from the identity provider. It uses standard OpenSSH with no gateway or proxy in the path.

Not necessarily. Workloads that already authenticate to Vault are the case its PKI engine was built for, and that setup can stay. Smallstep also issues workload certificates, through ACME, a cert-manager issuer, and cloud instance identity, and some teams consolidate to reduce the number of CAs they operate. The stronger reason to add Smallstep is the device fleet: CA-verified hardware attestation and managed certificate delivery, which Vault does not combine in one documented workflow.

Vault publishes CRLs and supports OCSP, and its documentation recommends short lifetimes so that revocation is rarely needed. Smallstep offers CRL and OCSP on Advanced Authorities. Offboarding a device is a sequence: removing it from inventory blocks new issuance and renewal but does not invalidate a certificate already issued; revoking the certificate changes access only where the relying service checks revocation; and ending an active session is a separate control at that service.

Self-managed Vault is a cluster your team runs: storage, unsealing, upgrades, and replication, with a managed option in HCP Vault Dedicated. Vault has been under the Business Source License since 2023, IBM completed its acquisition of HashiCorp in February 2025, and EST, CMPv2, and SCEP require Vault Enterprise. Smallstep's device identity platform is hosted, with self-hosted options for teams that need them, and the step and step-ca tools underneath it are open source. Compare the cost of the editions and the people needed to run each for the certificates in question.

The Smallstep agent is documented for Windows, macOS, and Linux, each requiring a TPM 2.0 or Secure Enclave for attested enrollment. ChromeOS enrolls through Google Verified Access. iOS and iPadOS use ACME device attestation through a supporting MDM, and Android uses Dynamic SCEP without attestation. Some workflows use the attested device identity to obtain a separate application credential, while supported Apple workflows can use the device identity certificate directly. Key protection depends on the platform and application and is published in the documentation rather than averaged into one claim.

No. Vault's SCEP support relies on the MDM to deliver the profile and the challenge. Smallstep uses the MDM as an inventory source and a delivery channel for the agent and certificates, and works with Jamf, Intune, Workspace ONE, Mosyle, Iru, Fleet, and Google Workspace.