Keep Vault for secrets and workload PKI. Add attested device identity with Smallstep.
Vault and Intune already support SCEP enrollment for managed devices. Smallstep adds CA-verified hardware attestation on supported enrollment paths and manages certificate delivery and renewal for supported Wi-Fi, VPN, and SSH workflows.
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A caller under a role, or a device in a managed fleet?
Vault's PKI roles sign for an authenticated caller: an AppRole, a Kubernetes service account, a cloud identity. For Linux workloads, Vault Enterprise's TPM auth method verifies a key was created in an enrolled TPM. Vault Agent automates obtaining and renewing the login certificate. Vault's TPM auth CA signs it. Vault Enterprise can also enroll Intune-managed devices over SCEP. What Vault does not document is one workflow that combines MDM inventory, CA-verified hardware attestation, and certificate delivery across a mixed endpoint fleet. Smallstep provides that on supported paths.
- Vault PKI roles: caller plus role; Vault ACME: control of a name
- Smallstep: attestation on supported paths plus an MDM-synced inventory
- Workload PKI versus fleet certificate management

Vault with Intune SCEP, or attested Windows enrollment
Vault Enterprise with Intune SCEP works: Vault sends the challenge and CSR to Intune for validation, then signs if validation succeeds, and Intune can require TPM key storage on Windows. TPM-backed is not the same as CA-verified attestation. On Smallstep's attested Windows path, the agent proves the device key was created in the TPM and the CA verifies that against inventory before signing. Intune or the Smallstep agent can then manage the Windows Wi-Fi profile. Removing a device from inventory blocks issuance and renewal; a certificate already issued can still be accepted until it expires unless it is revoked and the relying service checks revocation.

Who gets the certificate onto the endpoint?
With Vault, delivery belongs to something else: Intune deploys the SCEP certificate and Wi-Fi profile, and Vault Agent writes certificates on servers. Smallstep manages delivery and renewal itself for supported Wi-Fi, VPN, and SSH workflows. Some workflows use the attested device identity to obtain a separate application credential. Key protection depends on the platform and application; the service enforcing access is configured on its side.

SSH: a signing service, or managed access
Vault's SSH engine signs user and host certificates, and its roles can restrict principals. Deploying the certificates, configuring host trust in sshd, and creating and retiring the accounts stay with your configuration management. Smallstep SSH issues short-lived certificates after single sign-on, can require an attested device, and enrolls hosts with their own certificates and synced users and groups.

Neither replaces the other
Smallstep does not store secrets, broker database credentials, or offer encryption as a service, and it does not offer EST or CMPv2 today, which Vault Enterprise does. Vault PKI does not document ACME device attestation, and Vault has no documented workflow that combines an MDM-synced inventory, hardware attestation, and credential deployment for Wi-Fi, VPN, and apps across a mixed endpoint fleet; its TPM auth serves Linux workloads logging in to Vault. Keep your existing X.509 trust anchor and sign a Smallstep intermediate beneath it.

When Vault PKI is the right starting point
If the certificates are for services that already authenticate to Vault, or for network gear that needs EST or CMPv2, and your team already runs the cluster, Vault PKI is a sound choice. If Vault and Intune SCEP already meet your fleet's requirements, keep them. Add Smallstep when you need CA-verified hardware attestation or consistent certificate lifecycle management across a mixed fleet.
- Service and pipeline certificates behind Vault auth: begin with Vault
- Fleet enrollment that Vault and Intune SCEP already cover: keep it
- CA-verified attestation or one lifecycle across a mixed fleet: add Smallstep
- Run both under one root when the estate needs both
What Smallstep adds to a Vault estate
Attestation checked against the fleet inventory
On supported paths, the TPM or Secure Enclave attestation is checked against inventory before issuance.
An inventory that gates issuance
Devices sync from your MDM. Devices not in the inventory get no certificate.
Delivery to the endpoint
MDM profiles and the Smallstep agent install and renew the certificate.
Client profiles deployed too
Wi-Fi, VPN, and SSH are configured on the device to use the certificate.
Hosted authorities
Authorities run in Smallstep's cloud. No cluster to unseal or upgrade.
Keep your existing trust anchor
Your existing root signs the Smallstep intermediate. Clients keep trusting the same anchor.
Keep Vault for secrets and workload PKI. Add attested device identity with Smallstep.
Attested enrollment against your MDM-synced inventory on supported paths, credentials delivered and renewed on the endpoint for Wi-Fi, VPN, and SSH, and device verification at sign-in.